Italy-United States

Richard Gardner, who states that he and Brzezinski masterminded Carter’s election to the White House, recreates in his book Mission:Italy some difficult moments we went through. Such as 1978, the terrible year in which Moro was killed

by Giulio Andreotti

Richard Gardner, US ambassador to Italy from 1977 to 1981, in a photo taken in Venice in 1977

Our relationship with the United States does not depend on the four-yearly change in the White House and the consequent change of their ambassador in Rome. The characters of the ambassadors are very different, not least because – with very few exceptions - they are not career diplomats and are sent in reward for considerable contribution to a presidential election, that can be financial, vote-gathering (John Volpe a big influence in the Italian immigrant community and Max Rabb for the Jewish vote) or one might say programmatic.
Professor Richard Gardner belongs to this third category. In his recent book of memoirs (Mission:Italy) he tells in detail how he and another professor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, together constructed within a few months the political image of a candidate and so led the almost unknown governor of Georgia, Jimmy Carter, to the heights of the presidency. Interesting, here, is the light thrown on the election mechanism, with the dizzying growth in popularity (and vice versa) if the right television campaign is hit on.
Dynasties and long periods at the helm can maybe create difficulties, but with the maximum of two terms there is the risk, given the world responsibilities of the president, that when one begins to understand the world’s problems it’s already time to fade back into anonymity.

That Carter – a splendid man and one of genuine and never ostentated religious conviction – relied a great deal on his advisers I was myself personally aware. He had written to all of the government leaders in the Alliance to react with letters to the tough criticism that the Soviet Union had launched against the American project for a neutron bomb. I did my duty and, shortly afterwards in Washington, I reassured the president I had sent the letter to Breznev. He stunned me by telling me not to talk of the bomb of which he was a very strong opponent. «It’s a fixation of Admiral Rickover».
In the interregnum period – between the victory in November and the installation in January – I had been received by the defeated president who – through the good offices of John Volpe – gave Italy a hand in easing the crushing situation in its public finances. On that occasion they introduced me to Cyrus Vance, already named as the new Secretary of State.
Volpe’s dismissal was unusually brusque. Vice-president Mondale programmed a visit to Rome for 26 January and the ambassador was ordered to vacate the premises beforehand, without even the essential farewell visits. Perhaps there were old grudges, but we got a poor impression from the lack of style. Mondale was accompanied by Professor Gardner, designated but still not accredited to the Quirinale. However Gardner, married to the Venetian Danielle Luzzatto, made an excellent impression and we let them get on with the quarrels between Democratic and Republicans.

... not least because – with very few exceptions - they are not career diplomats and are sent in reward for considerable contribution in the presidential elections, that can be financial, vote-gathering (John Volpe a big influence in the Italian immigrant community and Max Rabb for the Jewish vote) or one might say programmatic.

A United States’ fixation - with different tones but with prevailing monotony - was the fear that the Communists might come to power in Italy. And it was a continual round of warnings, criticisms, closures, including the ban on giving visas to the communists themselves. The interdict was even collegial for at the Porto Rico summit Chancellor Schmidt warned Italy – on behalf of the English, French and Americans as well – not to change policy. Rumor and Moro took the blow, but they were very bitter about it. For that matter, much earlier the ambassadress (or ambassador, if you like) Claire Luce had described De Gasperi as not very manly, exalting Pella as a man because he did some sabre-rattling in reaction to an alleged threat from Tito.
When Carter (and Gardner) took office, we were in a very difficult moment. With the killing of Moro, his policy of convergence took a hard knock and Berlinguer, who was in parallel seeking for a way to detach from Moscow, found himself in an uncomfortable position.
There was, however, a fixed point that it was not right to underestimate. The non-belligerency of the Communist Party of 1976 (after non-stop opposition from 1947) came about on a precise agreement. The Communists undertook to formally recognize that the Atlantic Pact and European Community were the fundamental points of reference of Italian foreign policy. In November 1977 this had been solemnly proposed and voted by the Communists in Parliament. The early elections certainly did not reward them. However the shift had taken place and it would have been wise to take proper account of it.
I left Palazzo Chigi and the presidency went to Francesco Cossiga, whom it had been thought to set aside immediately after the death of Moro. In my new post as president of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Lower House I continued to work, with a stance of obvious defensive firmness, for the current that effectively backed arms reduction. That was to come with the Reagan administration and the agreements with Gorbacev.

Richard Gardner, author of <I>Mission: Italy</I>, between Francesco Cossiga and Giuliano Amato at the end of the book launch in the Chamber of Deputies, 14 September 2004

Richard Gardner, author of Mission: Italy, between Francesco Cossiga and Giuliano Amato at the end of the book launch in the Chamber of Deputies, 14 September 2004

In his memoirs Gardner sets me in a bad light because of a letter I wrote to the leader of the Christian Democrats Gerardo Bianco. He wants to make it pass as weakness or worse. I wrote because I was in hospital for a surgical operation. Here is the wording: «Dear Bianco, I read the order of the day set out. An addition seems necessary to me, on page 2, that – with a different tone – could go either after the thirteenth line in the first paragraph or as clause I immediately after (I would become II, etcetera). I also refer to a wish, more or less explicitly expressed by all the Italian parliamentarians in the recent meetings with the US. And I start from the constatation that Manca’s statement in the said venue - the commitment to construction does not mean commitment to deployment - it is not acceptable to the Americans. The additional amendment would be this: “The NATO program for modernization may not take off – and on the matter Italy will make the due proposals - if, while awaiting the negotiations that are to be undertaken with immediacy and great commitment, precise decisions for stopping production and deployment of SS20 and similar field nuclear weapon systems are taken by the Warsaw Pact”. In this way we would also make a clear attempt not to break off the convergence in foreign politics there was in the past legislature. I believe that, also for the purposes of military security and of our real role in the Alliance, an effort to convince should be made. Will the Communists and Socialists go along with it? Will the Soviet Union second it? I don’t know: but on our part we must not withdraw. Also in tune with a cult of peace to which the Catholic world is particularly alive and alert. I will also speak of it to Ruffini, Sarti and Forlani».

When Carter (and Gardner) took office, we were in a very difficult moment. With the killing of Moro, his policy of convergence took a hard knock and Berlinguer, who was in parallel seeking for a way to detach from Moscow, found himself in an uncomfortable position...

Naturally one may disagree, but it is not right to interpret it as weakness or “third way” thinking.
On another occasion I remarked the mutual difficulty with the embassy in Villa Taverna. In early 1954 at a discussion of foreign policy among our parliamentary group I mentioned the logical inevitability of the recognition of the People’s China. A few days later I received an invitation to breakfast from Mrs. Luce and, to my surprise, there was only a third person there, Adviser Stabler (who was later Head of Mission in Spain). Without any preambles the ambassadress told me to get the idea out of my head. «The American Senate would never open the UN to communist China». For the rest the conversation was easy and, conceding to me, out of her generosity, good faith and a certain naivety, she also offered my family a vacation in her villa in the Hawaiian Islands. It didn’t suit me, an everyday Roman; but I was grateful.
I must make a point in the chronology, let us say, of events to the memoirist Richard Gardner. It concerns the wretched affair of the occupation of the American embassy in Teheran, shortly after the start of the terrible adventure. I had never spoken of it until Pierre Salinger mentioned it in his book.
By chance I came into contact with lawyer Cheron whose office had got Khomeni into France, and so had a precise link with him. I asked him to come to Rome and he laid out a possible solution to me. Iran would ask for the extradition of the Shah with a very tough detailed accusation. The Americans should give wide publicity to it but object that, in the absence of an ad hoc treaty, the extradition was impossible. That would be enough to get the occupiers out of the embassy.

On 4 November 1979, in answer to the blocking of Iranian bank accounts in the US and to the hospitality offered to the Shah in exile, five hundred Iranian students occupied the American embassy in Teheran taking 52 people hostage

I immediately told Ambassador Gardner of the chance, and he seemed obviously interested. Two days later he came, with a certain embarrassment, to tell me that the President was grateful but, since the search for a solution was in the hands of the Secretary General of the United Nations, it seemed wise not to interfere. I informed Cheron, who was surprised to hear it. Another month passed. I don’t know if it happened before or after the attempt of the disastrous helicopter raid to free the prisoners. It was said that authoritative voices had predicted that as soon as they landed with the American flag the people - ever extremely faithful to the Shah - would rise up and drive out the men of the revolution.
Gardner came to me and asked me to get back in touch with Paris. Regretfully I couldn’t do so. I gave the ambassador the indications so he could do it directly. The result - negative – is known.
On one side and the other they were playing a supposedly shrewd game. Keeping Carter in check in election year could be politically and perfidiously useful to them. While the president, locked into a position of intransigence, could believe he looked the strong man not to be pensioned off.

... There was, however, a fixed point that it was not right to underestimate. The non-belligerency of the Communist Party of 1976 (after non-stop opposition from 1947) came about on a precise agreement. The Communists undertook to formally recognize that the Atlantic Pact and European Community were the fundamental points of reference of Italian foreign policy

It remains a fact that the embassy was cleared when Carter was defeated. The welcome for the freed “prisoners” was one of the first acts of the new administration, given huge television coverage.
The detailed account of the Richard Gardner years recreates many difficult moments we went through (the easy ones weren’t frequent, come to that) including the complex relationships with international financial institutions (the World Bank and the Monetary Fund).
So-called political demands lead to the need to bypass strict auditing, not least because sometimes the medicine prescribed by the experts is inapplicable. I remember when Bourghiba was made to triple (or something similar) the price of bread. The following day he had millions of Tunisians out on the streets and could not, at that moment, increase it by even ten cents. We weren’t proposing such drastic surgery, but we often had to struggle hard to agree on possible cuts.
In the book spoken of, the author also expresses severe judgments on his fellow countrymen. As when he argues with the political adviser Mike Leeden, who had insinuated in a book that the Gardners had been destined to Rome to support the cause of the Italian Communist Party. The profile of his precursor Martin is also severe, for other reasons. Ambassador Martin was in truth in Rome in a moment of personal depression because he had just had to lower the American flag in Vietnam (1975). He had few contacts (I remember that after months he still hadn’t visited the President of the Lower House) and some were the wrong ones. However he later declared that he had saved democracy in Italy by financing the parties. Since I had been president at that time, I wrote him several times inviting him to give names and specifications. I never got an answer.
In the documentation used for the book, Gardner records a “tough talk” with me in November 1976 on instructions from Washington where the impression was that «the role and influence of the Communist Party in the Italian government is in continual growth». To give solemnity to this chastisement, Gardner, with his adviser Holmes present, invited me to lunch with my diplomatic attaché La Rocca.

Enrico Berlinguer, Secretary of the Italian Communist Party, shaking the hand of Aldo Moro, President of the Christian Democrats, 20 May 1977

I understand that it was a matter of instructions received by him, but I was very annoyed. To prevent the Communists from crossing the picket line was one of our precise political objectives and we really didn’t need anybody calling us to order. It’s a defect the Americans often had, independently of the sort of president and congressional majority.
When the shift was made from simple abstention to agreeing the program - always with a government made solely of Christian Democrats – Washington became even more twitchy.
The daily possibility of consulting the archives enables one to discover clamorous on-goings. Such as (Gardner doesn’t enter here) when Moro was about to allow Nenni’s Socialists into government, and concerned not to frighten the Americans, he was anxious for me to remain because, as Minister of Defense, I guaranteed continuity in the Alliance. We didn’t know (and Aldo never did know) that the Socialists had had direct and multi-purpose relationships with the American government, including formal encounters over there made by the Honorable Pieraccini, who was later an authoritative member of the new government.
To conclude my review of this interesting memoir, let me cite a passage that concerns Gardner himself. His protocol visit to Ingrao (leader of the Italian Comunist Party) as President of the Lower House brought him under attack at home from rightist opinion makers. Meeting President Carter in London for the economic Summit, I had occasion to speak to him about it, describing the attack on Gardner as stupid since he seemed to me to be performing his role in perfect fashion. I see now that Gardner learned about it from the State Department and recorded it with pleasure.